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ABSTRACT 
With the pending debate on the 1995 Farm Bill, crop insurance and disaster assistance 
have become major topics for discussion. This paper explores the performance of the current 
MPCI program and presents alternative programs. The need for a unified approach to ease the 
problem of agricultural instability is addressed .. 
THE SAFETY NET OF FARMING: AN INTRODUCTION 
AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE 
AND OTHER STABILIZATION POLICIES AND PROPOSALS 
As the time approaches for debate and preparation of the 1995 Farm Bill, the issues 
of agricultural insurance, disaster assistance, and farm revenue stabilization have again 
surfaced as major areas of policy debate. Tweeten (1993) wrote: 
... agriculture continues to be troubled by problems of 
international competitiveness and efficiency, environment, 
family farm loss, farm succession, cash flow, poverty, 
instability, and farm community decline. Commodity programs 
either are not helpful in addressing these problems or need 
extensive restructuring to address these problems in a cost-
effective manner. 
Tweeten also stated that economic instability in U.S. agriculture provides the strongest 
justification for commodity programs; however, he suggested that more effort in insurance, 
buffer stocks, and forward pricing mechanisms by the private sector would be a more cost 
effective approach than current government programs. Agricultural economic instability 
arises from a variety of sources; market price fluctuations, weather conditions, and domestic 
and foreign agricultural policies all contribute to this instability. Numerous authors have 
examined the issue of agricultural instability with proposals ranging from major revision of 
government commodity programs to assorted combined policy approaches containing various 
levels of government sponsored programs including agricultural insurance, stock-holding, 
trade policies, and pricing. This paper reviews some of these approaches to stabilization 
policy with a prime focus on crop insurance and its relationship to disaster policy, 
commodity programs, and a potential revenue insurance program. 
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Calls for reform of federal agricultural programs have come from producers, 
politicians, and scholars. Arguably, the current system of various ad hoc and supplemental 
programs does a lackluster job of providing agricultural stability. It contains programs that 
counteract and contradict each other. Implementation of disaster programs, for example, 
tends to reduce the crop insurance participation rate and exacerbate actuarial problems in the 
insurance program. Streamlining the system would create a unified, goal-oriented program 
to adequately address the agricultural instability problem in a clear, unobstructed manner and 
benefit producers, consumers, and policymakers. Budget constraints also add pressure to 
reform farm programs, as reduced resources imply that we need to "get more bang for our 
buck" in agricultural programs to meet all needs and concerns. 
A program's success or failure in alleviating agricultural instability depends upon the 
source of the instability. If price uncertainty creates most of the instability, price 
stabilization schemes would tend to reduce both price and revenue variability. However, if 
weather conditions (yield uncertainty) were the major factor, price stabilization would 
increase revenue variability (Heimberger 1989). Federal crop insurance is one policy 
approach to ameliorate agricultural instability. When the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 
1980 was passed, its primary goal was to replace all federal disaster assistance programs to 
farmers. As evidenced by the disaster relief efforts of 1983, 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1993, 
federal crop insurance has not reached the goal of full disaster assistance replacement. This 
paper examines the current crop insurance program and its problems, reviews the literature 
on the subject, and looks at proposed alternatives to this system. 
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U.S. Federal Crop Insurance 
The federal government first began its venture into crop insurance in the 1930s. Due 
to severe losses in the first few years, the program was scaled down to an experimental 
level, covering only a few crops within a limited geographic area. Federal crop insurance 
continued in this manner until 1980. During this experimental stage, the federal crop 
insurance plan was an effective risk management tool. Its historical loss ratio over the 
period was nearly 1.0, implying that the system ran on an actuarially sound basis. With the 
push to replace the statutory disaster assistance program of the 1970s, federal crop insurance 
was brought back out of the experimental closet. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 established federal crop insurance as the 
primary type of government disaster aid. The crop insurance program was extended to all 
counties that had significant agricultural production and to all crops for which sufficient 
actuarial data could be obtained. The program was designed to be delivered by private 
insurance companies reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). To 
induce both farmers and private insurers, the government subsidized 30 percent of the 
premium cost, allowed the producer to choose from three yield and price coverage levels, 
paid for both the delivery and servicing costs of private insurers, and assumed any excess 
indemnities over premiums. Thus, the federal government assumed most of the risk 
associated with the program. 
Since 1980, federal crop insurance has undergone a few changes. Federal crop 
insurance policies are multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI); they insure against the effects of 
draught, flood, pests, frost, and other natural occurrences. From 1981 to 1985, the 
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insurance and premium rates were based upon area yields and, because the MPCI program 
suffered from the insurance problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, loss ratios 
exceeded 1.0 over this period. In an attempt to correct this, the insurance and premium rates 
were adapted to be based on the producer's past proven yield performance and this is how 
the program still stands. 
It is not hard to argue that the goals of the federal crop insurance program have thus 
far failed to be reached. Ad hoc disaster assistance programs have become commonplace 
since 1980. Participation in MPCI has been below what was hoped for and expected. The 
MPCI program has suffered from a severe lack of actuarial soundness resulting in a 
considerable drain of funds. Problems that MPCI policies face are adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and rapid expansion (Harwood, Calvin, and Glauber 1991). 
Adverse selection can be viewed as a problem of asymmetric information. In the case 
of MPCI, the difference in information lies between the farmer and the insurer with regard to 
expected yields. Farmers whose expected yield is below (above) the insurance yield will 
(will not) purchase MPCI. Thus, MPCI serves only those producers who expect to receive 
excess indemnities over premiums; that is, the higher risk producers. Moral hazard is a 
problem of individual action. Once the farmer has obtained MPCI, it might be in his/her 
best interest to change input usage on the covered crops and increase the likelihood of 
collecting an indemnity on the crops. These two problems have been addressed in most, if 
not all, studies on agricultural insurance. 
The moral hazard dilemma shows the possible agricultural supply consequences of 
agricultural insurance. Ramaswami (1993) wrote that the supply response to agricultural 
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insurance has both a "risk reduction" and a "moral hazard" effect. Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg (1993) found that com farmers who purchased MPCI used more nitrogen 
fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and insecticides than uninsured farmers. Moral hazard 
would suggest that insured farmers would use riskier technology than uninsured farmers. 
Thus, fertilizer and the damage control inputs seem to be risk-increasing inputs. 
Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton (1993) examined moral hazard and adverse 
selection as a combined problem. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, they found 
insured farmers used fewer variable inputs and had smaller yields than uninsured farmers. 
Their results suggested most of MPCI's problems arise from adverse selection and moral 
hazard. With regard to the low participation rate, the authors stated "It may be that there is 
no insurance policy which will be attractive to a significant group of farmers while having 
prices sufficiently high to yield a positive return on the inevitable bad risks". Other papers 
that have studied these issues are those by Ahsen, Ali, and Kurian (1982); King and Oamek 
(1983); Skees and Reed (1986); Nelson and Loehman (1987); and Chambers (1989). 
Since participation in the MPCI program is low, the demand for crop insurance has 
been studied by several authors. Goodwin (1993) examined the demand for MPCI by Iowa 
com producers during the period 1985-90. Employing county-level data, Goodwin found the 
per acre premium, previous yield, percentage of land rented, land value, average size of 
farm, and an interaction term between the per acre premium and the loss-risk were the 
significant variables affecting the decision to purchase MPCI. The loss-risk is the county's 
average ten year loss ratio (indemnities/premiums) normalized by the state average loss ratio. 
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The author also concluded that adverse selection would be aggravated by raising premiums in 
an attempt to achieve better actuarial results. 
Khojasteh (1992) examined 18 possible variables that could explain demand for MPCI 
by Iowa farmers using data collected through the Iowa Farm Finance Survey. He used three 
model specifications: linear, probit, and logit. Relevant variables to MPCI demand were the 
farmer's age, disaster aid receipts, total acres, total gross sales, the farm's net worth, the 
farm's after tax asset rate of return, and the farmer's view of future government agricultural 
policy. Khojasteh also found disaster aid could have both positive and negative effects on the 
demand for MPCI, instead of just the expected negative effect. 
Hojjati and Bockstael ( 1988) also developed a model to investigate the demand for 
MPCI. They formed equations describing crop insurance and planting diversification choices 
as a joint decision. Yield variability was of primary interest while price variability was 
virtually ignored. The study examined the area-based MPCI of 1981-85 since their study 
relied on 1982 data. 
Other papers have looked at a variety of issues concerning MPCI ranging from 
measuring willingness-to-pay for the program to how distributional assumptions affect 
participation rates. Williams, Harper, and Barnaby (1990) examined producer preferences of 
different combinations of government programs (deficiency payments, crop insurance, and 
disaster relief) for northeast Kansas com and soybean farmers. Using stochastic dominance, 
the authors found that for a farm planting a com-soybean rotation the dominant combination, 
based upon per acre net returns, was MPCI for com and disaster assistance for both com and 
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soybeans. They also conducted willingness-to-pay analysis to see how much premiums 
would need to change in order to make the producers indifferent among program choices. 
Nelson (1990) criticized the distributional assumptions underlying crop insurance 
premiums. He revealed that assuming normally distributed yields creates a larger loss 
probability than assuming beta distributed yields. He recommended that a more flexible 
distribution with respect to skewness should be employed since crop insurance losses are not 
independent. Arguing that the central limit theorem does not hold for crop insurance losses, 
Nelson concluded that the use of the normal distribution implied higher premiums for MPCI 
than they should be if yields are negatively skewed. This would help to explain the low 
participation levels for crop insurance because nonparticipants indicate that premiums are too 
high. His findings are the opposite of Skees and Reed (1986), who concluded symmetric 
distributional assumptions lead to lower premiums. 
Patrick and Rao (1989) investigated MPCI's risk management role for hog/crop farms 
in central Indiana. Overall, they found MPCI to have a limited risk management role. 
Farms were divided into three debt levels and two off-farm income levels. The analysis was 
conducted for four levels of yield variability. The authors found MPCI had the greatest risk 
management capability for medium or high debt farms with high yield variability. 
Fraser (1992) estimated producers' willingness-to-pay for crop insurance in the 
Australian wheat industry using numerical methods. He did not differentiate between 
individual- and area-based crop insurance since he assumed identical producers; that is, 
yields are identically distributed and perfectly correlated. Using normally distributed yields 
and a mean-variance framework, Fraser studied the impact of crop insurance on the level and 
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variability of income. He found his results to be sensitive to the coverage level and to yield 
variability, but not to price variability or the utility function specification (CRRA, CARA, or 
quadratic). His results implied moderately risk-averse farmers would prefer crop insurance 
even if premiums exceed actuarial cost by nearly 10 percent. 
Driscoll (1988) and King (1988) examined the setting of insurance and premium rates. 
Skees and Nutt (1988) investigated crop insurance pricing effects on financially stressed 
farms and found crop insurance could hurt or help depending on the farm's debt and loss 
ratio situation: Leatham, Richardson, and McCarl (1988) and Pflueger and Barry (1988) 
examined lender response to crop insurance. 
Crop Insurance Alternatives 
Many studies have been conducted on alternatives to the current crop insurance 
program and comparisons of these alternatives with MPCI. These alternative approaches 
seek to solve agriculture's problems through quelling price, yield, and/or revenue instability. 
A variety of insurance and "assurance" programs are outlined. Many, if not all, of these 
schemes face the same problems of adverse selection and moral hazard; but each tries to 
diminish their effects. Also, many of the authors aim their programs at a unified approach to 
agricultural policy. 
Mayer ( 1991) suggested modifying the deficiency payments program to cover low 
yield years by adjusting target prices to counteract differences between actual and target 
yields. As the difference in yields becomes more positive (negative), the target price falls 
(rises). This adjustment to the deficiency payments program would provide income 
protection in low yield years. Mayer discussed several options to setting the yield, including 
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a five-year average and a ten-year trend, and showed with set price adjustments how the 
modified program would payout in comparison to the current deficiency payments program 
for both wheat and corn. Target price adjustors could use national, state, county, or 
individual yield data, trading program sensitivity for administrative cost. Possible problems 
with the system include that those outside a disaster area could receive benefits depending on 
the scale of the program; that is, whether it is based on national, state, county, or farm data. 
Miranda and Glauber (1991) also recommended modifying the deficiency payments 
program. To cover low yield years, they set a target revenue for farms and payments are 
based on the difference between the target revenue and the area's average revenue. Their 
program relied upon individual production being highly correlated with area production. 
Using a regional corn model, the authors showed that for the same cost the target revenue 
program provided better income protectiof!, smaller revenue variability, and stabilized 
government expenditures over the target price-crop insurance program now in place. They 
examined the target revenue program using national, state, and county data. For each 
program, the deficiency payment was the same. Miranda and Glauber found the current 
government program destabilized county level per acre corn revenues for program 
participants (in comparison to nonparticipants); but that the target revenue programs, at any 
level, would stabilize them, with the county level program performing the best. If the 
program support price is low, the revenue stability was decreased and the program is less 
likely to eliminate the need for disaster assistance. An individual farm-based target revenue 
program was not brought out in great detail since moral hazard problems could arise. The 
results were robust to different demand and export function parameters. The authors, 
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though, warned that this type of analysis should be conducted on other crops before 
generalizations about the possibilities of this program are made. 
Cochrane and Runge (1992) proposed reducing a majority of the current agricultural 
programs for major field crops and combining all farming and most conservation acreage into 
an individual "farm base" for the purpose of gearing payments to stabilize farm income. 
Farmers would be allowed to plant a variety of crops to maintain their base (although the 
switching of crops would be controlled to avoid major production shifts). Payments would 
be based upon the relationship between indices for prices received and paid for a regional 
"basket" of commodities. Three-year moving averages of the indices were used to determine 
if payments were needed for six regions of the country. When the percentage change in paid 
price index exceeded the percentage change in received price index, payments were 
triggered. The payments were developed on a per acre basis and would allow differing 
payments across regions. Limits would be put on both the total farm program receipts and 
total government expenditures. 
Harrington and Doering (1993) proposed a complete reshaping of federal agricultural 
programs in an attempt to "provide comprehensive risk management (gross revenue 
insurance) and forward planning prices for. farm commodities". Their program combined 
actuarially sound crop insurance with commodity price stabilization through deficiency 
payments. Nonrecourse and marketing loans, set-aside requirements, flex acres, bases, 
disaster relief, ARP, 0/92, 50/92, Farmer Owned Reserve, PIK certificates, and storage 
payments would all be eliminated. Target prices and yields would be established by 10- to 
15-year moving averages of market prices and yields. This program was modeled after the 
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Ontario Market Revenue Plan. The authors compared revenues and costs for nonparticipants 
and participants in the current government programs and their program for wheat, corn, and 
soybeans. They indicated their program could be self-financing in six to eight years. 
Moving to the realm of area-based crop insurance, Miranda (1991) compared an area-
based crop insurance to the current MPCI. He recommended the area-based insurance to cut 
down on the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Differentiating the area-based 
insurance proposed here and the area-based insurance of 1981-85, the program put forth here 
scales all coverage, premiums, and indemnities on area yields; the 1981-85 program based 
coverage and premiums on area yields, while indemnities were based on farm yields. 
Applying the theoretical area-based crop insurance to western Kentucky soybean farms, 
Miranda compared MPCI, full coverage area insurance, and optimal coverage area insurance. 
Optimal coverage area insurance is optimal in the sense that the producer could choose 
various levels of coverage, including coverage over 100 percent of yields. The author 
concluded yield variance reduction was the highest under optimal coverage area insurance 
followed by MPCI and full coverage area insurance. Premiums and indemnities were 
measured in bushels per acre. Miranda also stated area insurance would virtually eliminate 
moral hazard, and the risk reduction performance of area crop insurance would depend upon 
the correlation between farm and area yields and the farm's yield variance. 
Skees (1993) looked at the Group Risk Plan (GRP), a form of area crop insurance 
that will be pilot tested for eight major crops in 1994. The GRP was first used in 1993 for 
soybeans. The GRP allows the producer to choose among six trigger yield levels: 65, 70, 
75, 80, 85, and 90 percent of expected county yield. A protection level of up to 150 percent 
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of expected revenue is allowed to attract high yield farmers. The indemnity is equal to the 
product of the percentage shortfall and the protection level. (Administrative costs are 
estimated to be nearly 40 percent of the total net cost of MPCI. This would be significantly 
lowered under GRP.) Advantages of GRP are that adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems should diminish, administrative costs to both the government and the producer will 
fall, and higher possible coverage levels can be obtained at a lower cost. Skees put forth 
four possible reasons MPCI participation is lower than expected: 
1. Premiums are higher than producers will accept, even with the insurance subsidy; 
2. Farmers expect disaster relief for large crop losses; 
3. Farmers are unable or unwilling to acknowledge low probability events that cause 
large losses; and 
4. Some farmers are willing to accept the risk and self-insure. 
One problem with the GRP program is that farms could suffer a loss when the county stays 
above the trigger yield level. Three suggestions to combat this problem are: 
1. Combine a low level (50 percent coverage level) MPCI with GRP; 
2. Develop better crop zones with homogeneous conditions, instead of using 
counties; and 
3. Encourage private insurance companies to offer supplemental insurance products 
(such as hail insurance). 
Others who have encouraged the push for area-based crop insurance are Barnaby and Skees 
(1990) and Glauber, Harwood, and Skees (1993). 
Williams et al. (1993) used stochastic dominance of farm-level net return distributions 
to compare the government commodity programs, MPCI, area crop insurance, a linked 
deficiency payments-crop insurance program, individual disaster assistance, and area disaster 
assistance for Kansas wheat and sorghum producers. They found that risk-averse farmers 
would need a subsidy to prefer area crop insurance over MPCI. The results indicated that 
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the government commodity program and individual or area disaster relief programs were the 
least dominated strategies. Farmers with higher yield risk preferred individual crop 
insurance, while those with lower yield risk would be more willing to accept area crop 
insurance. Subsidies in the range of 10 to 30 percent of producer costs were needed for 
farmers to prefer area crop insurance. 
Carriker eta!. (1991) tested the yield-equivalent variability and the gross income 
variability under five disaster relief schemes. The effects of MPCI, optimal coverage area 
crop insurance, full coverage area crop insurance, individual disaster assistance, and area 
disaster assistance with and without deficiency payments were examined for Kansas wheat 
and corn farmers. For yield-equivalent variability, the results were the same for all four 
cases. MPCI brought out the largest reduction followed by optimal and full coverage area 
insurance. These results also held for the reduction in gross income variability for wheat 
without deficiency payments and both corn and wheat with deficiency payments. For corn 
without deficiency payments, MPCI again led the way and individual disaster assistance was 
preferred over both full and optimal coverage area crop insurance in this case. 
Revenue Insurance 
Articles on revenue (or portfolio) insurance and "assurance" have appeared recently. 
Turvey and Amanor-Boadu (1989) looked at premium setting for revenue insurance for a 
representative Ontario cash crop farm. They pointed out the problem of assuming a normal 
distribution when the underlying distribution is nonnormal. If, for instance, the underlying 
distribution is positively skewed, then the normality assumption leads to higher premiums. 
In 1993, the Iowa Farm Bill Study Team, under the Iowa Plan, suggested "revenue 
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assurance" replace MPCI. Under revenue assurance, the federal government would support 
farmers a set percent of their gross revenue. The plan would bring farming decisions back 
into the market and out from under government control (from commodity programs). The 
program would keep CRP in place and eliminate set-aside requirements and ARP. 
Employing a nonlinear, farm-level analysis of agricultural insurance, Kay len, 
Loehman, and Preckel (1989) tried to account for moral hazard effects under price, yield, 
and revenue insurance plans. Under CARA utility, the model predicted input-output 
decisions for the various insurance plans and yielded willingness-to-pay measures for each. 
Turvey (1992a) examined price, crop, and revenue insurance. Using normally distributed 
yields, he estimated premiums for each type of insurance and a combined price and crop 
insurance for com, soybeans, and wheat. He found revenue insurance premiums would be 
lower than the combined insurance premiums. Turvey also mentioned the link of futures 
contracts to revenue insurance. 
In another study, Turvey (1992b) compared price insurance, crop insurance, crop and 
price insurance, good-specific revenue insurance, and general revenue insurance. The study 
was specifically aimed at the new GRIP for a representative southern Ontario farm under a 
direct expected utility maximization problem. Agricultural insurance was seen to stimulate 
risk-neutral behavior; that is, to produce higher risk crops, and premium subsidies reinforced 
this behavior. Good-specific revenue insurance sets a target revenue for each good; if the 
actual revenue is below this, an indemnity is paid. Price and/or yield declines can trigger 
payments. Price insurance sets a target price; if the price falls below the target, the 
indemnity is paid on the basis of a fixed yield, not on the actual yield. General revenue or 
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portfolio insurance establishes a coverage level for the entire crop mix based upon expected 
returns. The premiums are set ex post. Indemnities are paid if gross revenue drops below 
the coverage level for any reason. Turvey looked at the corn, soybean, and mixed grains 
crops and showed that using normal densities to describe the skewed distributions of yields, 
prices, and revenues resulted in the overstating of the risk reduction effects of insurance. If 
premiums were subsidized, the author concluded the combined price and crop insurance 
would be preferred since it yielded a higher utility and expected profit. If premiums were 
actuarially sourid, 80 percent price insurance was preferred. Turvey also compared dollars 
of public expenditure per dollars of risk reduction and found general revenue insurance was 
the best at promoting self-insurance through diversification. 
Glauber, Harwood, and Miranda (1989) examined the effects of five disaster relief 
options on market prices, commodity program participation, producer revenue, and budget 
outlays. These options were MPCI, free crop insurance for commodity program participants, 
compulsory crop insurance for program participants, a target revenue program, and a disaster 
assistance program. They found program costs would be roughly the same except for the 
target revenue program, which would cost more. Free crop insurance would boost 
commodity program participation. Compulsory crop insurance had different effects on 
participation, depending on the commodity. Participation rates fell under the disaster 
assistance and target revenue programs. The target revenue program was the best at 
stabilizing per acre farmer income and market prices. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Each of these studies presents a program geared toward alleviating agricultural 
instability. Successful strategies to resolve price, yield, and/or revenue volatility depend 
upon many factors, including the sources of instability and their magnitudes. Many have 
concluded that some form of agricultural insurance or assurance is the most appropriate way 
to reduce instability. As mentioned at the outset, a unified approach is needed for 
agricultural policy and programs. The piecemeal programs of the past and present have cost 
us in agricultural efficiency, stability, and government expense. Reducing these problems 
should be the primary goal of all those concerned with agriculture. 
Ways to reform current government programs as well as alternatives have been 
examined. Federal crop insurance has failed to reach its goals. Alternative programs, such 
as revenue insurance, would suffer from the same problems as those encountered by existing 
programs. Success will be measured by the program's ability to reduce these problems and 
to provide stability to agriculture in an efficient manner. 
During the next few years, these issues will receive much more attention, especially 
with the debate over the 1995 Farm Bill. The final package will be crafted by the political 
battles among budget hawks, agricultural backers, and commodity groups. Most of the 
alternatives discussed here may be considered as the main element of federal disaster 
assistance for the future. But each program's effects on both the budget and agriculture 
should be viewed with skepticism. 
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